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Abstract An increasing amount of posts on social media are used for disseminating news
information and are accompanied by multimedia content. Such content may often be mis-
leading or be digitally manipulated. More often than not, such pieces of content reach the
front pages of major news outlets, having a detrimental effect on their credibility. To avoid
such effects, there is profound need for automated methods that can help debunk and verify
online content in very short time. To this end, we present a comparative study of three such
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methods that are catered for Twitter, a major social media platform used for news sharing.
Those include: a) a method that uses textual patterns to extract claims about whether a tweet
is fake or real and attribution statements about the source of the content; b) a method that
exploits the information that same-topic tweets should be also similar in terms of credibility;
and c) a method that uses a semi-supervised learning scheme that leverages the decisions of
two independent credibility classifiers. We perform a comprehensive comparative evalua-
tion of these approaches on datasets released by the Verifying Multimedia Use (VMU) task
organized in the context of the 2015 and 2016 MediaEval benchmark. In addition to compar-
atively evaluating the three presented methods, we devise and evaluate a combined method
based on their outputs, which outperforms all three of them. We discuss these findings and
provide insights to guide future generations of verification tools for media professionals.
Keywords Fake detection · Verification · Credibility · Veracity · Trust · Social media ·
Twitter · Multimedia
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a tremendous increase in the use of social media platforms such as
Twitter and Facebook as a means of sharing news content and multimedia, and as a source
and sensor of trends and events [1]. The simplicity of the sharing process has led to large
volumes of news content propagating over social networks and reaching huge numbers of
readers in very short time. Especially multimedia posts (images, videos) can very quickly
reach huge audiences and become viral due to the fact that they are easily consumed.
Given the speed of the news spreading process and the competition of news outlets and
individual news sources to publish first, the verification of information and content is often
carried out in a superficial manner or even completely neglected. This leads to the appear-
ance and spread of large amounts of fake media content. In particular, when a news event
breaks (e.g., a natural disaster), and new information and media coverage is of primary
importance, news professionals turn to social media to source potentially interesting and
informative content. It is exactly this setting, when the risk of fake content becoming widely
disseminated is the highest. By fake, we refer to any publication or post with multimedia
content that does not represent accurately the event that it refers to. It may be reposted
content falsely associated with a current event, digitally manipulated content, computer-
generated imagery presented as real imagery or speculations regarding the association of
persons with a current event. In a similar way, by real we refer to posts with content that
rightly represent the event they claim to. There are also posts that, despite sharing fake mul-
timedia content, explicitly report that the content is fake (e.g. to warn readers) or they refer
to it with a sense of humor; those are excluded from our study.
An example of reposted content is a widely shared photo of two young children hugging
each other (Fig. 1a). The image was claimed to depict a brother who is protecting his lit-
tle sister during the earthquake in Nepal (April 2015), but it was later reported that it was
taken a decade ago in a province of Vietnam by a professional photographer. In some cases,
the consequences of fake content reaching a very large part of the population can be quite
severe. For example, fake images became popular on social media after the Malaysia Air-
lines passenger flight disappeared on 8th March (Fig. 1b illustrates an example). During
the investigation of the plane trace, false alarms that the plane was detected came up. Tak-
ing into account how sensitive the case was, the circulation of this content deeply affected
the people directly involved in it, such as the families of the passengers, causing emotional
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Fig. 1 a Siblings’ photo from Vietnam reposted as being from Nepal earthquake. b Fake media content
spread during the Malaysian airlines breaking news story
distress. An extended analysis on rumor propagation during the London riots [32] concluded
that rumors typically start with someone tweeting about an incident, which then gets re-
tweeted and reposted in a number of variations. An interactive representation1 of the riots’
rumors across time shows the velocity with which fake information propagated and the fact
that hours, even days are needed to debunk such false claims.
There are several challenges that journalists face in the process of assessing the verac-
ity of user-generated content. Notably, “traditional” digital media verification techniques
employed by journalists [34], e.g. looking into the Exif metadata2 of content or getting
in touch with the person that published it, are often not possible or very slow due to the
characteristics of social media platforms. For instance, Twitter and Facebook remove the
Exif metadata from posted images, and Twitter accounts in most cases provide no contact
information (e.g., email, telephone number). Furthermore, conventional image forensics
approaches are hardly applicable due to the image resizing and recompression operations
that are automatically applied by these social media platforms to all uploaded content [38].
The above challenges highlight the need for novel tools that can help news professionals
assess the credibility of online content. To this end, we present and compare three auto-
mated approaches to solve this problem on Twitter. This study is based on the Verifying
Multimedia Use (VMU) task [4] that was organized as part of the 2015 and 2016 editions
of the MediaEval initiative,3 with the goal to benchmark methods on the problem of auto-
matically predicting whether a tweet that shares multimedia content is misleading (fake) or
trustworthy (real). The presented approaches [7, 21, 26] are the ones that competed in this
1http://www.theguardian.com/uk/interactive/2011/dec/07/london-riots-twitter
2Exif metadata contain information about the date, time and location an image was taken, the model of the
device, and copyright information, which can be very useful when assessing the credibility of multimedia
content [34].
3http://multimediaeval.org/
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task and include a) a method that uses attribution in tandem with fake and genuine claim
extraction, b) a method that verifies tweets by exploring inter-tweet information, and c)
one that uses a semi-supervised learning scheme. This study conducts and presents a com-
prehensive comparison between them in a more extended experimental setting, and draws
actionable insights regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each method. In particular,
the main contributions of this article include the following:
– We describe a new benchmark dataset based on a revised and extended version of
the MediaEval dataset. Our revised dataset has duplicate and near-duplicate tweets
removed and its cross-event balance improved to reduce content bias toward more
popular events. This dataset is publicly available for other researchers to use for
benchmarking.
– We report a new experimental analysis using this new benchmark dataset follow-
ing a leave-one-event-out cross-validation scheme. Each of our fake classification
approaches is evaluated and its ability to predict the veracity of content analyzed and
contrasted.
– We present results derived from an ensemble of the three fake classification approaches.
We analyze the advantages of the ensemble-based approach and show that it is more
effective in classifying fake content than each individual method on its own. This result
provides a benchmark for other researchers to compare against in the future.
2 Background
Classifying online content with respect to its credibility and veracity is a highly complex
problem that has been studied in multiple settings and using a variety of approaches. Our
work focuses on the problem of single post verification, i.e. classifying an individual content
item as being fake or real. This is in contrast to the related problem of rumor detection
[41], which considers that a piece of false information is spreading across social networks.
Although rumor detection is a highly relevant research problem and several methodological
aspects are common with those arising in our problem setting, the following discussion is
mostly focusing on single post verification approaches.
Several of the previous studies in the area focused on the statistical analysis on social
media with the goal of extracting features that can be used as robust verification indicators
for classifying social media content (Section 2.1). Another field of study concerns methods
for assessing the credibility of the source (or user account), where a post of interest origi-
nates (Section 2.2). A different research area concerns the development of image forensics
approaches that can potentially provide valuable complementary signals to the verification
process (Section 2.3). We also present in Section 2.4 a few systems that attempt to solve
the problem by leveraging methods and results from the works of Sections 2.1–2.3. Finally,
we provide a description of the Verifying Multimedia Use (VMU) task (Section 2.5) that
constitutes the basis for our experimental study.
2.1 Verification cues for social media content
Several previous studies focus on the automatic extraction of credibility cues from the con-
tent of social media posts, either by using Natural Language Processing from the posts’ text
or by extracting other features. For instance, Castillo et al. [11] presented a supervised learning
method toassesscontent credibility inTwitter.Theyextractdiscussion topics that are categorized as
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news or chat by human annotators and they build a model to automatically determine which
topics are newsworthy by assigning a credibility label to them. Martinez-Romo et al. [25]
retrieve tweets associated with trending topics and use blacklists to detect spam URLs in
them. Then, they introduce language models based on probability distributions over pieces
of text and by adding content features, they apply several models to evaluate their approach,
which achieves high accuracy in classifying tweets with spam content. O’Donovan et al.
[29] performed an analysis of the utility of various features when predicting content credi-
bility. First, they collected Twitter data derived from very different contexts and they defined
a set of features including content-based features, user profile features, and others that focus
on the dynamics of information flow. Then, by checking the distribution of each feature
category across Twitter topics, they concluded that their usefulness can greatly vary with
context, both in terms of the occurrence of a particular feature, and the manner in which it is
used. The work in [15], which is very similar in terms of objective to the VMU task that we
study in this paper, tries to distinguish between fake and real images shared on Twitter by
using decision tree-based classification models on tweet text and Twitter account features.
Using Hurricane Sandy as the evaluation dataset, they report a 97% detection accuracy.
2.2 Source and user credibility on social networks
Several approaches focus on the study of user behavior on social networks as well as on
the detection of spam accounts. Stringhini et al. [36] investigated techniques for automated
identification of spam accounts on Twitter by detecting anomalous behavior. They used six
features (friend-follower ratio, URL ratio in messages, similarity of messages sent by a user,
friend choice, messages sent, friend number) in a classification model and managed to iden-
tify about 15,000 spam accounts on Twitter. Canini et al. [9] proposed a method, that, given
a particular topic, identifies relevant users, based on a combination of their expertise and
trust. The authors employed an LDA topic model, using keywords extracted from the user
profile, to estimate the association between a user account and a topic and then rank them
based on their credibility. Additionally, Starbird et al. [35] examined an automated mecha-
nism for identifying Twitter accounts providing eyewitness testimony from the ground. They
used profile features, such as number of statuses and of followers, and features that describe
how the Twitter community interacts with the user during the event. Finally, they applied
an SVM classifier with asymmetric soft margins and they managed to achieve promising
results on the task. Two of the methods proposed in this work also use features derived from
social media accounts (including newly proposed features) with the aim of finding common
characteristics of users that tend to share misleading content.
2.3 Image forensics
Image forensics has been long used for assessing the authenticity of images by detecting
whether a digital image has been manipulated. Image manipulation is typically classified
as splicing (transferring an object from an image and injecting it into another), copy-move
(copying an object from the same image to a different position) or retouching (enhancing
contrast, sharpening edges or applying color filters). These manipulations normally leave
digital traces that forensics methods try to detect. The method in [14] exploits inconsis-
tencies in the Color Filter Array (CFA) interpolation patterns, allowing for accurate splice
localization. Since the most common format of digital images is JPEG, numerous meth-
ods try to exploit traces left by the JPEG compression process. In [24] and [31], different
methods are proposed to determine whether an image was previously JPEG compressed.
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In [3], original and forged regions are discriminated in double compressed images for both
aligned (A-DJPG) and non-aligned JPG (NA-DJPG). Double and triple compressions are
detected and discriminated in [30], by exploiting the analysis of the Benford-Fourier coeffi-
cients. A method for tampered regions detection was proposed in [23] on the block artifact
grids (BAG), which are caused by the block-based processing during JPEG compression
and are usually mismatched in copy-move or splicing manipulations. Other methods aim to
detect non-native JPEG images by analyzing quantization tables, thumbnails and informa-
tion embedded in Exif metadata [22]. For copy-move detection, many methods have been
proposed in the recent years, mainly based on the matching of keypoints [2], or regions
[18]. For detecting image retouching, most current methods exploit illumination or shadow
inconsistencies [28], or geometric relations disagreement [12] within an image. Despite the
proliferation of image forensics methods, a recent experimental study [39] has concluded
that many of them are ineffective on real cases of manipulated images sourced from the
Web and social media due to the fact that such images typically undergo multiple resaving
operations that destroy a considerable part of the forensic traces. Nonetheless, one of the
compared methods in our study makes use of forensics features (extracted from the image
accompanying the tweet) as additional verification signals.
2.4 Systems for assessing content credibility
In the context of assessing content credibility, Ratkiewicz et al. developed the Truthy system
[33] for real-time tracking of political memes on Twitter and for detecting misinforma-
tion, focusing on political astroturf. Truthy collects tweets, detects memes and introduces
a web interface that lets users annotate the memes they consider truthful. Another system
for evaluating Twitter content is TweetCred [16], a system that computes for each tweet a
credibility score. It takes the form of a Web application that can be installed as a Chrome
extension. The system encourages users to give feedback by declaring whether they agree or
not with the produced score. We include TweetCred in our comparative experimental study
as a state-of-the-art method.
2.5 Verifying multimedia use (VMU) task
To assess the effectiveness of automated tweet verification methods, we rely on resources
produced by the VMU task [4], which was introduced in 2015 as part of the MediaEval
benchmarking initiative. The definition of the task is the following: “Given a tweet and the
accompanying multimedia item (image or video) from an event of potential interest for the
international news audience, return a binary decision representing verification of whether
the multimedia item reflects the reality of the event in the way purported by the tweet.” In
practice, participants received a list of tweets that include images or video and were required
to automatically predict, for each tweet, whether it is trustworthy or deceptive (real or
fake respectively). An unknown label is also accepted in case that there is no available
prediction for a tweet. In addition to fully automated approaches, the task also considered
human-assisted approaches provided that they are practical (i.e., fast enough) in real-world
settings, such as manually identifying the veracity of a multimedia item by searching on
trustworthy online websites or resources. The following considerations should be made in
addition to the above definition:
– A tweet is considered fake when it shares multimedia content that does not faith-
fully represent the event it refers to. The variety of untrustworthy and misused content
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Fig. 2 Different types of misleading multimedia use. From left to right: a reposting an old photo showing
soldiers guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier claiming it was captured during the Hurricane Sandy in
2012, b reposting digital artwork as a photo from the solar eclipse in March 2015, c speculation of depicted
people as being suspects of the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, d spliced sharks on a photo captured
during the Hurricane Sandy
appearing in the context of past events led us to devise a small typology of misleading
use of multimedia content (see Fig. 2).
– A tweet is considered to be real when it shares multimedia that accurately represents
the event it refers to.
– A tweet that shares content that does not represent accurately the event it refers to but
reports the false information or refers to it with a sense of humor is neither considered
fake nor real (and hence not included in the datasets released by the task).
For each tweet, the task has also released three types of feature:
– tweet-based (TB-base): Extracted from the tweet itself, e.g. the number of terms, the
number of mentions and hashtags, etc. [8].
– user-based (UB-base): Based on the Twitter profile, e.g. the number of friends and
followers, the account age, whether the user is verified, etc. [8].
– forensics (FOR): Forensic features extracted from the visual content of the tweet
image, and specifically the probability map of the aligned double JPEG compres-
sion, the potential primary quantization steps for the first six DCT coefficients of
the non-aligned JPEG compression, and the PRNU (Photo-Response Non-Uniformity)
[13].
3 Description of verification approaches
3.1 Using attribution, fake and genuine claim extraction (UoS-ITI)
This approach is motivated by an established journalistic process for verifying social media
content [34]. The central hypothesis is that the “wisdom of the crowds” is not really wis-
dom when it comes to verifying suspicious content. Instead it is better to rank evidence
from Twitter according to the most trusted and credible sources in a way similar to the one
practiced by journalists.
A trust and credibility model was created based on an NLP pipeline involving tok-
enization, Part-Of-Speech (POS) tagging, Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Relation
Extraction (RE). The novelty of this approach lies within the choice of regex patterns, which
are modeled on how journalists verify fake and genuine claims by looking at the source
attribution for each claim, and the semi-automated workflow allowing trusted lists of enti-
ties to be utilized. A novel conflict resolution approach was created based on ranking claims
in order of trustworthiness. To extract fake and genuine claims, a set of regex patterns were
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Named Enty Paerns Examples
@ <ANY>
(NOUN | PROP_NOUN | NAMESPACE)
(NOUN | PROP_NOUN | NAMESPACE) (NOUN | PROP_NOUN 
| NAMESPACE)
@bbcnews, BBC News, CNN.com, CNN
Aribuon Paerns
…<NE> <SYMBOL> <URl> 
<NE> *{0,1} <lMAGE> *(0,2) <URl> …
<NE> *{0,1} <FROM> *{0,2} <URl> …
<RT> <SYMBOL>{0,1} <NE> …
… <FROM> *{0,2} <NE>  
What a great picture! @bbcnews: hp://bit.|y/1234
@bbcnews image - hp://bit.|y/1234
@bbcnews releases photo hp://bit.|y/1234
RT: @bbcnews "|ove|y picture of …
… eyewitness report via @bbcnews
Faked Paerns
… <lMAGE> *{0,1} ^<POSnot> <FAKED> …
… <POSis> <POSa>{0,1}^<POSnot> <FAKED> *{0,1} <lMAGE> …
… <POSis>{0,1} <POSnot> <POSa>{0,1} <REAL> …
… image is fake! ...
… is a fake image …
… Is not a real …
Genuine Paerns
… <lMAGE> <POSis> *{0,1} ^<POSnot> <REAL> …
… <POSis> <POSa>{0,1} ^<POSnot> <REAL> *{0,1} <lMAGE> …
… <POSis>{0,1} <POSnot> <POSa>{0,1} <FAKE> …
… image is totally genuine …
… is a real image …
… Is not a fake …
Key
(mm) = n to m matches allowed 
<NE> = named enty 
<SYMBOL> = symbols (e.g. : = -) 
<POSnot> = POS adverbs RB (e.g. not, never) 
<POSis> = POS verbs VBZ, VBD (e.g. is, was) 
<POSa> = POS determiner DT (e.g. a, the) 
* = any non-whitespace characters
^ = forbit match
<lMAGE> = image variants (e.g. image, video)
<FROM> = from variants (e.g. via, aributed)
<FAKED> = fake variants (e.g. fake, hoax)
<REAL> = real variants (e.g. real, genuine)
<RT> = RT variants (e.g. RT, MT)
Fig. 3 Verification Linguistic Patterns in UoS-ITI. These patterns are encoded as regex patterns matching
on both phrases in content and their associated POS tags (e.g. NN = noun, NNP = proper noun)
created (see Fig. 3) matching both terms and POS tags. Claims of an image being fake or
genuine occur infrequently, and by themselves are not sufficient. If an image is claimed to
be real without any supporting attribution we assume it is fake, since from our own anal-
ysis strong debunking posts almost always contain attribution. We combine all fake and
real claims with trusted source attribution (e.g. via BBC News) to discover strong evidence.
To extract attribution, a combination of Named Entity (NE) matching, based on noun and
proper noun sequences, and regex patterns for source citation was used. Other researchers
have published linguistic patterns that were used to detect rumors [8, 10, 40], but the com-
bination of fake/genuine claims and source attribution used by the UoS-ITI approach is
novel in that it uses insights from well-established journalistic processes for social media
content.
First, an NLP pipeline is executed (see Fig. 4) that takes in each tweet from the test
dataset and tokenizes it using a Punkt sentence tokenizer and a Treebank word tokenizer.
To help the POS tagger, no stemming is applied and text case is preserved. Each tokenized
sentence is passed to a Treebank POS tagger, which supports more European multi-lingual
tagsets than other taggers (e.g., Stanford POS tagger), an important consideration for future
work as breaking news can happen anywhere in the world, not just English speaking
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Social Media Text
(e.g. Tweet)
Clean & Tokenize 
(sent and word)
POS Tagging
Named Enty 
Recognion
Compute 
Sentence Tree 
Variants
Relaonal 
Extracon 
(regex paerns)
(Un)Trusted 
enty Matching
Image Content 
Cross-check
Trustworthiness 
Assessment
Decision 
(fake, real)
Mul-lingual  
Grammer –
Named Enty 
Regex
Mul-lingual  
Grammer
- Aribuon 
Regex
- Faked Regex
- Genuine Regex
Informaon Extracon
Trust and Credibility Analysis
Stoplist Enes
Trusted Enes
Untrusted Enes
TreeTagger
Enty Recognion
Fig. 4 NLP pipeline for regex-based NER and RE in UoS-ITI
locations. Namespaces and URI’s are extracted prior to tokenization and re-inserted after
POS tagging as explicit NEs so they can be matched using regex expressions later.
The employed NER strategy is based on a regex POS expression that matches unigrams
and bigrams with nouns, proper nouns, namespaces and Twitter usernames. This is a high
recall-low precision approach to NER as we want to capture all relevant NEs at this stage.
Next, a lookup table is used to filter candidate NEs into sets of trusted, untrusted and
unknown entities; this allows the removal of known false positive NE values and the appli-
cation of blaklist and whitelist values. Finally, candidate NEs are used to create the POS
and NE-labeled sentence, which is passed to a set of regex expressions encoding typical
relationship phrases for fake, real and attribution claims.
The approach is semi-automated in that it exploits a list of a priori known trusted and
untrusted sources. All news providers have long lists of trusted sources for different regions
around the world so this information is readily available. For this task, a list of candidate
NEs was created by first running the NER regex patterns on the test dataset. Then, each NE
was manually checked via Google search (e.g. looking at Twitter profile pages) and NEs
were removed that were considered as irrelevant for inclusion in a list of trusted or untrusted
sources by a journalist. Instead, NEs were kept that included news organizations, respected
journalists and well cited bloggers and experts. Creating these lists took under two hours
(570 NEs checked, 60 accepted).
The employed RE approach uses a set of regex expressions that match serialized POS and
NE tagged sentence trees. These regex expressions were manually created after a detailed
analysis of the linguistic patterns from Twitter, YouTube and Instagram around a number of
previously crawled event types (e.g., hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, blackouts, conflicts,
etc.). For finding attributed NEs, all the common ways were studied, in which social media
users attribute sources. This is typically either as a reference to a NE followed by a link or
image reference, or a statement claiming that a link or image reference is created and/or
verified by an NE. For fake and genuine claims, regex patterns are created from the most
commonly phrased claims about images or links being fake or real. Examples of the regex
patterns can be seen in Fig. 3 and make heavy use of the POS tags to avoid being overly
term specific.
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Once all the attributed sources, fake and genuine claims have been identified, a trustwor-
thiness decision for each image is made. Just like human journalists, claims are ranked by
trustworthiness based on whether the claim comes directly from a trusted author (top rank),
is attributed to a trusted source (second rank) or is from an unknown source (third rank).
Claims directly by, or attributed to, untrusted sources are ignored. The final decision for
each image is taken based on only the most trustworthy claims. A conservative claim con-
flict resolution approach is used, where a fake claim by a source supersedes a real claim by
an equally trusted source.
3.2 Using a two-level classification model (MCG-ICT)
Existing approaches often formulate the tweet verification problem as a binary classification
task [8]. Features from tweet text and users are extracted to train a classifier at the message
(tweet) level. One problem of this training strategy is that tweets are trained and tested
individually. However, tweets in the real world have strong relations among each other,
especially, tweets of the same topic will likely have the same credibility: real or fake.
Rather than classifying each tweet individually, the MCG-ICT approach verifies tweets
by leveraging inter-tweet information, such as whether they contain the same multime-
dia content. It was empirically observed that even such simple implications among tweets
would be useful to boost the original message-level predictions. In fact, in recent work
[19, 20], links among tweets were built by clustering tweets into sub-events or topics.
Thus, credibility evaluation can be performed at different scales to provide more robust
predictions.
3.2.1 Two-level classification model
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the MCG-ICT approach comprises two levels of classification: a)
The message-level, which learns a credibility model per message (tweet). Features extracted
Tweets
Feature Set
Content Features  User Features  Other Features
Message Level 
Classiﬁer
Final Results
Topics
Topic Labeling
Topic Level 
Features
Topic Level 
Classiﬁer
Pre-results
Clustering
Feature Extracon
Feature Aggregaon
Fig. 5 Overview of the MCG-ICT two-level classification model. Topic-level classifications are fused with
the message-level ones to produce the final result
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from the text content, user information and other components of a tweet are used for train-
ing a classifier. b) The topic-level, i.e. a specific subject of discussion or sub-event under the
broader unfolding event. By assuming tweets under a same topic likely have similar cred-
ibility values, tweets are clustered into different topics. Compared with raw tweets, topics
eliminate variations of tweets by aggregating message-level credibility classifications. The
topic-level feature is computed as the average of the tweet-level feature vectors around the
topic. The following processing steps take place for topic-level classification:
– Topic clustering: In [19], a clustering algorithm is used to cluster tweets into sub-events.
But this algorithm performs poorly in forming topics in the target dataset as it is dif-
ficult to decide the optimal number of clusters. However, in the studied verification
setting, each tweet contains an image or video, and each image/video can be contained
in more than one tweets. This intrinsic one-to-many relation is used to form topics: each
image/video corresponds to a topic and tweets containing it are assigned to this topic.
– Topic labeling: Each topic is labeled using the majority of the labels of its tweets. These
labels are used for training the topic-level classifier. In fact, with the proposed topic
formation method, almost all tweets in a topic have the same label, resulting in topics
labeled with very high confidence.
– Topic-level feature aggregation: Message-level features (Section 3.2.2) of all tweets in
a topic are aggregated by averaging them to derive a single topic-level feature vector.
By taking the average of all tweets, the impact of noisy or outlier tweets is suppressed.
– Fusing topic-level result: After topic-level classification, a probability value is com-
puted for each topic representing the likelihood of it being fake. Then, for each tweet
in the topic, this value is added as a feature to its original feature vector. Finally, a
message-level classifier is trained with this extended feature in order to produce the
final results.
In terms of classification model, several options from the state of the art were tested, and
the selection was based on the performance on the development set using cross validation.
J48 Decision Trees were selected for the topic-level classification, and Random Forests for
the message-level classification.
3.2.2 Feature extraction
At the message level, we use as base features the ones shared by the task, TB-base and
UB-base (Section 2.5). Some additional features were also tested but not included in the
final approach configuration: word term features and several image features.
The commonly used term frequency (tf) and tf-idf features were tested. Experiments on
the training (development) set indicated that such features could lead to overfitting, since
they led to very high performance on general cross-validation and very low performance on
leave-one-event-out cross-validation. Since few words co-occur across different events, one
may assume that other keyword-based features (e.g., LDA) would also contribute little to
this task.
Several image-based features (e.g. image popularity, resolution) were also tested. Such
image features could replace the topic level features to train classifier at topic level, because
a topic is generated for each image as mentioned earlier. Experiments on the development
set showed that these features led to slightly worse performance for the topic-level classi-
fication, compared to content-based ones, and to much worse performance when combined
with message-level features. Moreover, image features cannot be applied directly on videos
included in the test set. Hence, those were not further considered.
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Tweets
TB CL11 CL12 CL1n
CL21 CL22 CL2n
+
+
Predicon 1
Fusion
Predicon 2
UB
Feature Extracon Bagging in model building Agreement-based retraining technique
Fig. 6 Overview of the CERTH-UNITN method
3.3 Using an agreement-based retraining scheme (CERTH-UNITN)
This approach combines different sets of tweet-based (TB), user-based (UB) and forensics
(FOR) features in a semi-supervised learning scheme. A more detailed exposition of this
method is presented in [5]. The approach builds on supervised classification models and an
agreement-retraining method that uses part of its own predictions as new training samples
with the goal of adapting to tweets posted in the context of new events.
Figure 6 depicts an overview of the method. It relies on two individual classification
models, one based on the combination of TB and FOR features and a second based on UB
features. Bagging is used to ensure higher reliability in the training process of the classifiers
(CL11 ... CL1n and CL21 ... CL2n), and an agreement-based retraining strategy (fusion) is
employed with the goal of improving the accuracy of the overall framework. All classifiers
are based on Random Forests of 100 trees.
3.3.1 Feature extraction
The approach uses the TB-ext and UB-ext features, which are an extended version of
the TB-base and UB-base released by the MediaEval task. For the FOR features, we also
include additional ones.
TB-ext: These are binary features extracted from the tweet text, e.g. the presence of a
word, symbol or external link. Language-specific binary features are also used correspond-
ing to the presence of specific terms; for languages, in which such terms are not available,
the values of these features are set to null (missing). Language detection is performed with a
publicly available library,4 and a feature is added for the number of slang words in
a text, using slang lists in English5 and Spanish.6 For the number of nouns, the Stan-
ford parser7 is used to assign POS tags to each word (only in English). For the readability of
text, the Flesch Reading Ease method is used,8 which computes the complexity of a piece
of text as a score in [0, 100] (0: hard-to-read, 100: easy-to-read).
4https://code.google.com/p/language-detection/
5http://onlineslangdictionary.com/word-list/0-a/
6http://www.languagerealm.com/spanish/spanishslang.php
7http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/lex-parser.shtml
8http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flesch Reading Ease
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UB-ext: User-specific features are extracted such as number of media
content, account age and others that refer to information that the profile shares.
In addition, these include whether the user declares a location and whether this can be
matched to a city name from the Geonames dataset.9
For both TB and UB features, trust-oriented features are computed for the links shared,
through the tweet itself (TB) or the user profile (UB). These include the WOT metric,10 a
score indicating how trustworthy a website is according to reputation ratings by Web users,
the in-degree and harmonic centrality, which are rankings based on the links of the web
forming a graph,11 and web metrics provided by the Alexa API.12
FOR: For each image, additional forensics features are extracted from the provided BAG
feature based on the maps obtained from AJPG and NAJPG. First, a binary map is cre-
ated by thresholding the AJPG map (we use 0.6 as threshold), then the largest region is
selected as object and the rest of the map is considered as the background. For both regions,
seven descriptive statistics (max, min, mean, median, most frequent value, st. deviation, and
variance) are computed from the BAG values and concatenated to a 14-d vector. Figure 7
illustrates the feature extraction process. We apply the same process on the NAJPG map to
obtain a second feature vector.
3.3.2 Data pre-processing and bagging
To handle the issue of missing values on the features, Linear Regression (LR) is used for
interpolating missing values. This is applied only to numeric features as the method is not
applicable for boolean values. Only feature values from the training set are used in this pro-
cess. Data normalization is performed to scale values to the range [− 1, 1]. Furthermore,
bagging is used to improve the accuracy of the method. Bagging creates m different sub-
sets of the training set, including equal number of samples for each class (some samples
may appear in multiple subsets), leading to the creation of m instances of CL1 and CL2
classifiers (m = 9), as shown in Fig. 6. The final prediction for each of the test samples is
calculated using the majority vote of the m predictions.
3.3.3 Agreement-based retraining
Agreement-based retraining is used to improve the prediction accuracy for unseen events.
This is motivated by a similar approach implemented in [37] on the problem of polarity
classification. To this end, two classifiers are built CL1, CL2, each on different types of
feature, and their outputs are combined as follows: The two outputs for each sample of
the test set are compared, and depending on their agreement, the test set is divided in two
subsets, the agreed and disagreed sets. Assuming that the agreed predictions are correct with
high likelihood, they are used as training samples to build a new classifier for classifying the
disagreed set of instances. To this end, in the subsequent step, the agreed samples are added
to the best performing of the two initial models, CL1, CL2 (comparing them on the basis of
their performance using cross-validation on the training set). The goal of this method is to
retrain the initial model and adapt it to the specific characteristics of the new event. In that
9http://download.geonames.org/export/dump/cities1000.zip
10https://www.mywot.com/
11http://wwwranking.webdatacommons.org/more.html
12http://data.alexa.com/data?cli=10&dat=snbamz&url=google.gr
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Fig. 7 Illustration of forensics feature extraction process
way, the model can predict more accurately the values of the samples for which CL1, CL2
did not agree in the first step.
4 Experiments and evaluation
4.1 Datasets
The conducted experiments were based on the benchmark dataset released by the VMU
task in 2015 (Section 2.5). We refer to the original version of the dataset as dataset#1.
This has been collected over a number of years using a crowd-sourcing approach. Images
are found by volunteers (including the authors of the article), and paid micro-workers (via
Amazon Mechanical Turk). Each suggested content item was provided with associated news
reports or debunking articles by journalists, offering evidence regarding its veracity. These
were then used to provide ground truth labels (real/fake) for each tweet.
The dataset consists of tweets relating to 17 events listed in Table 1, comprising in total
197 cases of real and 191 cases of misused images, associated with 6,225 real and 9,404
fake tweets posted by 5,895 and 9,025 unique Twitter users respectively. Note that several
Multimed Tools Appl
of the events, e.g., Columbian Chemicals, Passport Hoax and Rock Elephant, were actually
hoaxes, hence all multimedia content associated with them was fake. For several real events
(e.g., MA flight 370) no real images (and hence no real tweets) are included in the dataset,
since none came up as a result of the conducted data collection process.
For further testing, we additionally created dataset#2, which is a subset of
dataset#1 by first performing near-duplicate tweet removal: we empirically set a mini-
mum threshold of similarity and computed the Levenshtein Distance13 for each pair of texts.
A small amount of near-duplicate texts exceeding the threshold were manually removed.
Note that in dataset#1 the number of unique fake and real multimedia items, which the
tweets are associated with, is highly unbalanced. As the aim of dataset#2 is to create a
balanced dataset, we randomly selected a subset of fake and real multimedia items as well
as the tweets associated with them.
Finally, to assess the stability of results, we also compared the methods on the dataset
that was used in the VMU task sequel in 2016 [6]. This is a superset of dataset#1, using
the latter as development set, while it contains an additional 998 real and 1,230 fake tweets
in the test set, organized around 64 cases of real and 66 cases of misused multimedia items.
The tweet IDs and image URLs for all of the above datasets are publicly available.14
4.2 Measuring accuracy by leave-one-event-out cross-validation
The conducted experiments aimed at evaluating the accuracy of each method on a variety
of unseen events. The features of fake tweets may vary across different events, so the gener-
alization ability of automated methods is considered an important aspect of its verification
performance. To this end, we used each time one of the events Ei , i = {1, 2, ..., 17} for
testing, and the remaining ones for training. For example, for evaluating the performance
on event E1, we used the tweets of E2, E3, ..., E17 for training, and the tweets of E1 for
testing. This is in contrast to the MediaEval task, where events E1-11 were used for train-
ing, and E12-17 for testing. To evaluate the approaches, we used the established measures
of precision (p), recall, and F1-score (F1). Assuming that the positive class is the case
that a tweet instance is fake, and negative that a tweet instance is real, we define these
metrics as:
p = tp
tp + fp , F1 =
2 · tp
2 · tp + fp + f n (1)
where tp refers to true positives (correctly detected fake), fp to false positives (real
misclassified as fake), and f n to false negatives (fake as real).
Table 2 presents the precision and F1-scores that the approaches achieved in the context
of the MediaEval tasks and on dataset#1 and dataset#2. We also compare our results
with those presented by the TweetCred method [16]. We have re-implemented a variation of
the method described in the paper: we identified the common tweet- and user-based features
that the CERTH-UNITN and TweetCred methods use, and we built classification models
for each of the datasets. We evaluated common state-of-the-art classifiers on each dataset:
SVM, RandomForest and AdaBoost. For the first two datasets (MediaEval ’15 and
dataset#1), SVM achieved the highest performance, while for the rest RandomForest
worked best. As can be seen, TweedCred ranks second on two of the datasets (dataset#2
and MediaEval’16), third on MediaEval’15 and first on dataset#1.
13http://rosettacode.org/wiki/Levenshtein distance#Java
14https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-verification-corpus/
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Table 1 Upper part: MediaEval’15 events and derivative datasets (#1, #2): For each event, we report the
numbers of unique real (if available) and fake images (IR , IF respectively), unique tweets that shared those
images (TR , TF ) and unique Twitter accounts that posted those tweets (UR , UF ). Bottom part: MediaEval’16
events and corresponding statistics
ID Event dataset#1 dataset#2
IR TR UR IF TF UF IR TR UR IF TF UF
E1 Hurricane Sandy 150 4,664 4,446 53 5,558 5,432 60 838 825 16 376 369
E2 Boston Marathon bombing 29 344 310 35 189 187 18 131 120 13 56 56
E3 Sochi Olympics – – – 14 274 252 – – – 9 76 74
E4 MA flight 370 – – – 23 310 302 – – – 13 88 87
E5 Bring Back Our Girls – – – 7 131 126 – – – 6 35 33
E6 Columbian Chemicals – – – 15 185 87 – – – 6 124 64
E7 Passport hoax – – – 2 44 44 – – – 1 5 5
E8 Rock Elephant – – – 1 13 13 – – – 1 4 4
E9 Underwater bedroom – – – 3 113 112 – – – 2 4 4
E10 Livr mobile app – – – 4 9 9 – – – 3 6 6
E11 Pig fish – – – 1 14 14 – – – 1 4 4
E12 Solar Eclipse 5 140 133 6 137 135 2 55 54 3 53 53
E13 Girl with Samurai boots – – – 3 218 212 – – – 2 16 16
E14 Nepal Earthquake 11 1004 934 20 356 343 6 113 107 8 178 176
E15 Garissa Attack 2 73 72 2 6 6 2 40 39 2 4 4
E16 Syrian boy – – – 1 1786 1692 – – – 1 197 195
E17 Varoufakis and zdf – – – 1 61 59 – – – 1 29 28
Total 197 6,225 5,895 191 9,404 9,025 88 1,177 1,145 88 1,255 1,178
Event IF TF IR TR Event IF TF IR TR
Gandhi Dancing 1 29 – – Woman 14 children 2 11 – –
Half of Everything 9 39 – – American Soldier Quran 1 17 – –
Hubble Telescope 1 18 – – Airstrikes 1 24 – –
Immigrants’ fear 5 33 3 18 Attacks in Paris 3 44 22 536
ISIS children 2 3 – – Ankara Explosions – – 3 19
John Guevara 1 33 – – Bush book 1 27 – –
Mc Donalds’ Fee 1 6 – – Black Lion 1 7 – –
Nazi Submarine 2 11 – – Boko Haram 1 31 – –
North Korea 2 10 – – Bowie David 2 24 4 48
Not Afraid 2 32 3 35 Brussels Car Metro 3 41 – –
Pakistan Explosion 1 53 – – Brussels Explosions 3 69 1 9
Pope Francis 1 29 – – Burst in KFC 1 25 – –
Protest 1 30 10 34 Convoy Explosion Turkey – – 3 13
Refugees 4 35 13 33 Donald Trump Attacker 1 25 – –
Rio Moon 1 33 – – Eagle Kid 1 334 – –
Snowboard Girl 2 14 – – Five Headed Snake 5 6 – –
Soldier Stealing 1 1 – – Fuji Lenticular Clouds 1 123 1 53
Syrian Children 1 12 1 200 Total 66 1,230 64 998
Ukrainian Nazi 1 1 – –
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Table 2 Precision and F1-scores achieved on a) MediaEval VMU 2015 task, with E1-11 used for training
and E12-17 for testing, b) dataset#1, c) dataset#2, and d) MediaEval VMU 2016 task. For b and c,
the leave-one-event-out cross-validation method was used for measuring performance
Method MediaEval ’15 dataset#1 dataset#2 MediaEval ’16
p F1 p F1 p F1 p F1
UoS-ITI 1.000 0.830 0.938 0.224 0.917 0.244 0.520 0.468
MCG-ICT 0.964 0.942 0.804 0.756 0.816 0.750 0.563 0.504
CERTH-UNITN 0.861 0.911 0.755 0.693 0.690 0.635 0.980 0.911
TweedCred [16] 0.680 0.800 0.810 0.820 0.810 0.650 0.580 0.720
Figure 8 illustrates the F1-scores of the tested approaches for each event of dataset#1
and dataset#2. The mean performance of the approaches is also illustrated in red. Events
are ordered based on the F1-score achieved by the highest-scoring method (MCG-ITI).
On average, it is clear that on dataset#1 the two-level classification method (MCG-ITI)
outperforms the other two. However, given that it strongly relies on the fact that tweets are
correlated when they share the same multimedia content, it seems that it performs better on
events that comprise only one or few unique multimedia cases (e.g. Passport hoax, Syrian
boy). When a single event includes numerous multimedia cases (e.g., Nepal earthquake),
its performance decreases. The UoS-ITI approach seems to accurately predict the posts
associated with video content (Syrian boy, Varoufakis and zdf). Similar results are obtained
on dataset#2 (Fig. 8).
In addition to F1-scores, we also report the corresponding precision scores in Fig. 9
for each event on dataset#1 and dataset#2. In both cases, the UoS-ITI approach
outperforms the other two, providing a very high precision (> 0.9) for the small set of
tweets it was able to classify. This is an important observation, since it allows us to
use the results of UoS-ITI as a type of pre-classifier in an ensemble-based approach
(Section 4.4).
Fig. 8 F1-scores for dataset#1 and dataset#2 per event and approach
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Fig. 9 Precision scores for dataset#1 and dataset#2 per event and approach
Another striking finding concerns the stability of performance of the three methods when
testing them on a different dataset (Mediaeval ’16). The CERTH-UNITN approach is a clear
winner in this case, since it is the only approach that manages to retain its performance
at comparable levels, while the other two approaches perform considerably worse. This
provides evidence in support of the generalization ability of the agreement-based retraining
method.
4.3 Measuring verification performance per multimedia item
A further experiment explores the verification accuracy of methods on each unique mul-
timedia item. Given that dataset#1 contains 388 unique multimedia items, we divided
tweets in groups according to the multimedia item they are associated with. Then, we calcu-
late the performance of each approach on each of those unique multimedia cases. Figure 10
illustrates the achieved F1-scores. In the horizontal axis, we present the unique multimedia
items. The figure reveals that the MCG-ITI and CERTH-UNITN approaches perform simi-
larly in the majority of cases, while the UoS-ITI achieves quite low performance compared
Fig. 10 F1-score across unique images for each approach. To make the visualization of results cleaner,
images in the x axis are sorted based on the mean F-score across the three approaches
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Table 3 Pairwise comparison of
F1-score distributions F1 = 0 F1 = 1 pearson corr
UoS-ITI vs MCG-ICT 53.3 0.7 0.295
UoS-ITI vs CERTH-UNITN 59.5 6.7 0.332
MCG-ICT vs CERTH-UNITN 51.5 9.5 0.707
Reporting percentages (%) where
the F1-score of both methods is
equal to 0 and 1, and the Pearson
correlation between them
to them, due to the fact that it avoids producing a result in cases where there is not sufficient
information to make this decision.
Another key question of this analysis is the level of overlap between the method results.
For this reason, we conduct pairwise comparisons between the previously generated F1-
score distributions. After calculating the number of multimedia items for which the methods
have an F1-score equal to zero and equal to one, we report the percentage of items, for
which the methods’ predictions agree. In addition, we calculate the Pearson correlation
between these distributions. Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. These make clear
that the three approaches are highly correlated in terms of the cases they fail to predict (F1-
score = 0) and less correlated in the cases where they succeed (F1-score = 1). The pairwise
Pearson correlations demonstrate that MCG-ICT and CERTH-UNITN approaches are much
more similar in their predictions compared to UoS-ITI. Overall, these experiments reveal
that there is potential for improving upon the results of the individual methods by fusing
their results, which we investigate in the next section.
4.4 An ensemble verification approach
We investigate three ensemble methods for fusing the results of the three approaches:
– ENS-MAJ: For each tweet, we aggregate individual predictions by majority vote. How-
ever, in the UoS-ITI approach, several of the predictions are marked as unknown,
which is a problem in case the decisions of the other two approaches disagree. To
overcome this tie, we assign the tweet as fake, assuming that it is preferable to falsely
consider a case to be fake than falsely consider it as real.
– ENS-HPF: This takes advantage of the high precision (low fp rate) of the UoS-ITI
method. If the UoS-ITI prediction for a tweet is other than unknown, we adopt it as
correct; otherwise, we check the other methods’ predictions and in case of disagreement
we consider the item to be fake.
– ENS-ORA: This is a hypothetical (oracle) ensemble method, which selects the correct
prediction if at least one of the methods’ predictions is correct. This provides an upper-
bound of the performance that could be theoretically possible if we could optimally
combine the three approaches.
Figure 11 presents the resulting F1-scores and precision per event of the ensemble meth-
ods. On average, these achieve higher performance than the individual approaches. This
result stems from the complementarity of the approaches’ outputs, which was illustrated
in Section 4.3, and the effectiveness of the proposed schemes in combining their outputs.
ENS-ORA delineates the maximum possible performance that is achievable by combin-
ing the three methods. Out of the two practical fusion schemes, ENS-HPF produces more
accurate predictions compared to ENS-MAJ as the former uses the highly accurate UoS-
ITI approach as the preferred approach for performing the classification and falls back to
the other two approaches in case UoS-ITI produces no result.
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Fig. 11 F1-scores and Precision of the ENS-MAJ, ENS-HPF and ENS-ORA ensemble methods for
dataset#1, mean score of each method on the dataset of MediaEval ’16 and individual mean scores of the
approaches
4.5 Relevance of experimental results for real-world use cases
These promising results from our ensemble verification approach should also be seen in the
context of typical use cases for automated verification of images and videos trending on
social media.
An example use case involving semi-automated verification is in support of journalists
who are trying to verify social media content for use in news stories. Breaking news in par-
ticular has competing objectives to publish content first (i.e. as quickly as possible) and get
the verification right (i.e. take enough time to ensure that the content is not fake). Publish-
ing eyewitness content before rivals will gain a journalist much kudos. Publishing a fake
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image, then later being forced to retract the story, can seriously damage a journalist’s repu-
tation. Let us consider a use case where a journalist wants to receive a live feed (e.g. every
5 or 10 minutes) of the top 500 trending images on Twitter, classified and filtered using our
ensemble of fake classifiers. Our best reported result (F1 = 0.79, p = 0.82, r = 0.81)
means that on average for 500 trending images, only 90 would be classified in error. Dur-
ing news events such as the Hurricane Sandy 2012 fake social media images on Twitter
[17, 27] outnumbered real images by two to one. In the context of our use case this means
that of the 500 images considered, 333 would on average be fake, and of those 333, 273
would be classified as fake and filtered. This represents a significant reduction in the images
the journalist needs to consider in real-time, something which is very useful when work-
ing under breaking news deadlines where a story must be verified and published within
minutes.
Another example user case, this time involving fully automated verification, is where
an automated news summarization platform wants to aggregate news feeds from sources
such as popular social media bloggers in real-time. Readers of such news summarization
platforms typically accept a higher number of false stories than they would from a journalist-
based news service. In this case the volume of trending images that need checking would be
much larger, with tens of thousands of images being checked as candidates for aggregation
into news alert summary snippets. The fully automated nature of our approach makes this
a viable proposition. Even for platforms like Storyful, where news snippets are passed to a
human checkdesk for a final verification step, our approach could have significant utility as
a pre-filter.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we presented a comparative study for automated approaches for verify-
ing online information with multimedia content. By presenting three different in nature
methods, we showed that there are several ways to deal with the challenging prob-
lem of verification. To measure verification accuracy, we evaluated these methods by
using leave-one-out cross-validation and by reporting their scores per multimedia case.
In the MediaEval’15 dataset and dataset#2, the MCG-ICT method achieved the
highest F1-scores, particularly for events with few cases of unique multimedia items.
The UoS-ITI achieved the highest precision scores with a very low false positive
rate for the events it could classify. The CERTH-UNITN method led to consistently
high results on average, and in particular on events with many tweets. Importantly,
it managed to retain its performance on the MediaEval’16 dataset, clearly outper-
forming the other two and the TweetCred method, and demonstrating the potential
of the agreement-based retraining scheme for making the approach applicable to new
datasets.
By combining approaches into an ensemble method we were able to further increase
the F1-score of the best performing method by approximately 7% (ENS-HPF) with
a theoretical upper bound of improvement of approximately 20% (ENS-ORA), which
is a very encouraging finding, and provides a state of the art benchmark for other
researchers in this field. To improve results even further we feel that more sophis-
ticated use of visual and contextual features are needed. This is a very challenging
area and will need a combination of image forensics, computer vision and cross-
referencing of contextual information (e.g. weather, maps, etc.) about the event of
interest.
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